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TRUSTS AND SUCCESSION
THOMAS A. THOMAS*
INTRODUCTION
The interval between the last 1 and present Survey has been an
active one for the courts of Florida in relation to trusts and succession. The
appellate courts have added further interpretations2 to the statutes in these
fields and have also acted upon matters in related fields that directly affected
the probate laws of Florida.3 The courts also considered several matters of
first impression, including the time permitted for filing a claim for wrongful
death against an estate4 and the rights of lineal descendants to take as a
class under alternative circumstances. 5
While the revision of statutes affecting trusts and the law of succession
was quite limited, the courts did not lose the opportunity to recommend
to the legislature certain changes and revisions considered necessary or ad-
visable to remedy problems arising under existing statutes.
LEGISLATION
Among the statutes passed by the 1961 session of the legislature was
an act authorizing the disposition of testamentary bequests and devises to
the trustee of an inter vivos trust that is evidenced by a written instrument
in existence at the time of the making of the will. 6 This provision is appli-
cable despite certain conditions that might have disqualified it previously.7
A statute was also passed for the purpose of clearly delineating the liabilities
of a trustee and restricting this liability to the trustee's own defaults and
negligence and imposing no liability upon him for the acts of a co-trustee,
banker, or other person entrusted with the responsibility of handling trust
assets.8 A further protection for the trustee is afforded by this statutory
* Professor of Law, University of Miami.
1. Thomas, Trusts and Succession, Fourth Survey of Fla. Law, 14 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 693 (1960).
2. In re Estate of Blankenship, 122 So.2d 466 (Fla. 1960); Toney v. Adair. 120
So.2d 622 (Fla. App. 1960): In re Aron's Estate, 118 So.2d 546 (Fla. App. 1960): Robin-
son v. Malik, 115 So.2d 702 (Fla. App. 1959); Drafts v. Drafts, 114 So.2d 473 (Fla.
App. 1959).
3. Geistman v. Zimmerman Trusts, 126 So.2d 576 (Fla. App. 1961); Martin v.
Wilson, 115 So.2d 573 (Fla. App. 1959).
4. Toney v. Adair, 120 So.2d 622 (Fla. App. 1960).
5. Drafts v. Drafts, 114 So.2d 473 (Fla. App. 1959).
6. FLA. STAT. § 736.17 (1961).
7. Notwithstanding that the trust is amendable, revocable, or both; that it has been
amended or revoked in part after execution of the will or codicil; that the trust instrument
was not executed as required by the statute of wills; that the trust res may only be the
expectancy of life insurance.
8. FA. STAT. § 691.04(8) (1961).
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revision by exempting the trustee from liability, where the settlor has re-
served the authority to direct investments to be made by the trust.
Several statutory revisions were enacted relating to claims against
decedents' estates. Shorter periods and new procedures for payment of and
objections to claims against decedents' estates have been adopted.9 Creditors
must now file their claims within six months from the date of first publi-
cation of notice to creditors instead of eight months as previously provided.
Shorter periods have also been provided for the delivery of legacies and
distributive shares, 10 the presenting of claims against unadministered
estates," and the filing of claims against estates with administration
unnecessary.' 2
These statutory modifications are obviously calculated to avoid un-
necessary delay in closing decedents' estates. They will also afford a surviving
widow a better opportunity to determine whether to elect dower since the
time for election remains at nine months from the date of first publication
of notice to creditors.
SuccEssIoN
A. Charitable Bequests
One of the problems encountered in making charitable bequests was
not definitely solved by a recent statutory amendment. 3 In In re Blanken-
ship's Estate 4 the supreme court interpreted the statute15 relating to
charitable devises and bequests made within six months of the testator's
death. The court delineated two conditions that must exist in order to
protect these bequests from invalidation by the statute: (1) the testator
must have expressed substantially the same bequest in the next to last will
made by him, and (2) the next to the last will must have been executed
at least six months prior to the testator's death. The court stated that,
while it considered the results illogical, it could not remedy what must be
done by the legislature.
B. Election to Take Dower
Legislative inadequacies were also the basis for comment by the court
when it was forced to preclude an incompetent wife from asserting dower
rights under the statute' 6 because she had not filed within the time per-
mitted. The wife of the testator had been adjudged mentally incompetent
9. FLA. STAT. § 733.18 (1961).
10. FLA. STAT. § 734.02 (1961).
11. FLA. STAT. §§ 734.29(3)-(5) (1961).
12. FLA. STAT. § 735.11(1) (1961).
13. Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-243, § 1, at 461.
14. 122 So.2d 466 (Fla. 1960).
15. FLA. STAT. § 731.19 (1961).
16. FLA. STAT. § 731.35 (1961).
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and was still incompetent at the time of her husband's death. The will of
the husband specified that the wife was to get a share equal to that of each of
his two daughters. When the wife, through her appointed guardian, elected
to take dower, a daughter successfully contested the election in that it was
not filed within nine months after the first publication of the notice to
creditors, although filed within nine months from the guardian's appoint-
ment.17
While this conclusion operated as a hardship, the court was powerless
to hold otherwise in view of the legislation presently in effect. When the
legislature provides a specific period for the assertion of a right, the courts
are powerless to make exceptions, since to do so would constitute judicial
legislation.
C. Lapse
At the common law, when a testamentary provision was made in
favor of a person who predeceased the testator, the provision lapsed with
no exception. That modern jurisdictions do not favor lapse is evidenced
by the fact that statutes have been enacted limiting lapse under certain
circumstances. The Florida anti-lapse statute18 is typical; it provides that
if a testamentary provision is made in favor of an adopted child or blood
kindred of the testator who predeceases the testator leaving surviving lineal
descendants, the gift does not lapse, but rather inures to the benefit of the
lineal descendants of the named beneficiary.
The anti-lapse statute applies with equal force to a class consisting
of the testator's blood relatives who are living at the time of the execution
of the will. However, as to members of a class who die prior to the will's
execution, the anti-lapse statute has no application and the provision made
in favor of such persons is deemed to fail. These principles found applica-
tion in Drafts v. Drafts.'9 The testatrix had seven brothers and sisters, three
of whom died prior to the execution of the will leaving lineal descendants
surviving. Two others died after the execution of the will, but prior to the
death of the testatrix, and left lineal descendants surviving. In determining
the rights of the lineal descendants of the beneficiaries under the will of the
testatrix, the court concluded that the anti-lapse statute had no application to
the members of the class of brothers and sisters who predeceased the execution
of the will, as a consequence of which the lineal descendants of these
class members were not entitled to share in the estate.
D. Testamentary Capacity
Any person eighteen years of age or older who is of sound mind has
17. In re Aron's Estate, 118 So.2d 546 (Fla. App. 1960).
1"8. FLA. STAT. § 731.20 (1961).
19. 114 So.2d 473 (Fla. App. 1959), 14 U. MIAMI L. REV. 702 (1960).
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capacity to execute a will.2 0 A person is considered to be mentally sound
for purposes of determining capacity if at the time of the will's execution he
has the ability to comprehend the nature of the disposition, his relationships
with the objects of his bounty and a recognition of the extent of his prop-
erty.2 1 The fact that a testator may have been adjudged mentally incompetent
before or after the time the will was executed does not necessarily invalidate
the will.2 2 The mental condition of the testator at the time of the will's
execution is the controlling factor and while his mental condition prior to
and subsequent to the execution of the will may be admissible into evidence,
such evidence is not conclusive. If a person executes a will after he has been
adjudged mentally incompetent by a court of competent jurisdiction, a
rebuttable presumption is created that his mental incompetency existed
at the time he executed his will.23 The burden of rebutting this presumption
is upon the proponent of the will. Thus, in Chapman v. CampbeU24 the court
declared that when a will was executed by a testator six years after he had
been declared incompetent, the testator was presumed to remain incom-
petent until the proponent of the will demonstrated that the testator's
sanity had been restored or that the will was executed during a lucid interval.
E. Mistakes
Courts are reluctant to modify a will because of a mistake made by
either the testator or by the draftsman of the will. This reluctance was
emphasized by the court in the case of In re Mullin's Estate.2 5 The testat-
rix had executed a codicil to her last will and testament which, when
finally executed and by virtue of the draftsman's mistake, did not corres-
pond to her instructions. While the court acknowledged that relief would
be granted if a will or any portion is obtained by fraud or undue influence,
it would be contrary to sound public policy to permit a mistake by the
draftsman to defeat the duly solemnized act of the testator. In denying
relief, the court was obviously concerned with the possibility of opening
the door to the perpetration of frauds. It appears to be more consistent
with public policy to permit a mistake by the testator or the draftsman
of the will to stand, rather than permit the possibility of fraudulent con-
duct in attempting to rectify a mistake.
F. Release of Dower
In Youngleson v. Youngleson's Estate26 the wife claimed she signed
20. FLA. STAT. § 731.04 (1961).
21. In re Bailey's Estate, 122 So.2d 243 (Fla. App. 1960).
22. Chapman v. Campbell, 119 So.2d 61 (Fla. App. 1960).
23. Ibid.
24. 119 So.2d 61 (Fla. App. 1960).
25. 128 So.2d 617 (Fla. App. 1961).
26. 114 So.2d 642 (Fla. App. 1959).
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a release of dower based upon consideration of her husband's consent to
a religious marriage ceremony. A second release for an added consideration
was also signed by the wife in favor of the husband's personal representative
and heirs. The wife sought to set both releases aside in an effort to elect
dower. The court held that in the absence of a showing of fraud or over-
reaching, a widow who has waived rights by agreement cannot regain them.
The wife sought to obtain additional funds by petitioning the court for a
family allowance. The court, in dealing with this aspect of the case, held
that the use of a claim for family allowance is not permitted as a device
to evade an agreement releasing dower since the family allowance is to be
resorted to only in emergency situations and is within the sound discretion
of the county judge.
G. Attorneys' Fees
While appraisers are permitted reasonable compensation for their ser-
vices,21 there is no statutory provision for the payment of fees charged
by attorneys employed by the appraisers and in the absence of a statutory
provision, payment of these fees cannot be authorized by the court .2  The
appraisers of an estate valued at more than 600,000 dollars had asked for
1500 dollars each for their services, and also asked for attorneys' fees
from the estate to cover the cost of their appeal from a court order setting
their fees at a lower figure. Since no separate agreement provided for the
payment of such attorneys' fees by the estate, these amounts could not be
recovered from the estate.29
H. Statute of Limitations
In the case of In re Brown's Estate30 the Florida Supreme Court was
called upon to consider whether the statutory limitation of actions on
claims against estates to three years came within the purview of the con-
stitution. In that case, the claim sought to be recovered was filed in 1949.
A statute3' passed in 1953 provided that if a claim "has not been paid,
settled or otherwise disposed of and no proceeding is pending for the en-
forcement . . . thereof, then at the expiration of three years from the date
such claim is filed such claim shall be forever barred . .. ."
The court held that the constitutional provision8 2 prohibiting the
enactment of a statute lessening the time for commencement of civil actions
existing at the time of the enactment referred only to causes of action
covered by the general statutes of limitations. Since in probate matters
27. FLA. STAT. § 733.07 (1961).
28. In re Field's Estate, 121 So.2d 46 (Fla. App. 1960).
29. Ibid.
30. 117 So.2d 478 (Fla. 1960).
31. FLA. STAT. § 733.211 (1961).
32. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 33.
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there had been no previous time limit, the statute was held to be consti-
tutional. The statute, continued the court, was passed as a matter of
public policy to require estates to be speedily and finally determined.
The statute of limitations does not commence to run against the
heirs until they are in a position to institute a suit. 3 This result is true
even though the statutory time to preclude the estate itself from main-
taining the action may have elapsed.
I. Jurisdiction
While by statute 4 the circuit court has concurrent jurisdiction with
the county judge's courts to construe wills, the latter has exclusive
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of wills. In re Dahl's Estate5 was the
result of a contest to declare invalid the will of the decedent and to annul
his marriage to his surviving widow. The jurisdiction of the circuit court
was invoked on the grounds that it had exclusive jurisdiction as to the
annulment of a marriage and concurrent jurisdiction with the county judge
to determine the validity of a will. The appellate court held it to be error
on the part of the county judge to have relinquished jurisdiction over the
subject matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of that court. The fact
that the county judge provided that he would reassume jurisdiction in the
event the circuit court did not act did not overcome the error.
The attaching of jurisdiction was also considered in determining the
dower interests in partnership property located in other states. In the case
of In re Binkow's Estate36 the court held that if the decedent was a Florida
resident, the courts of this state would characterize the partnership proper-
ty for purposes of dower as would the courts of the situs of the property.
If such a consideration establishes that the partnership property is realty,
the Florida courts would have no jurisdiction to award dower in it; if, how-
ever, the determination establishes the partnership property to be personalty,
jurisdiction of the Florida courts would attach based upon the decedent's
domicile in this state at the time of his death.
J. Personal Liability of Beneficiary
The beneficiary under a will is not personally liable in a tort action
which survives against the testator's personal representative. However,
property inherited by a beneficiary is subject to any condition or charge
imposed by the testator. This conclusion is predicated upon the well estab-
lished proposition that a person can dispose of his property in any manner
33. Connelly v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 120 So.2d 647 (Fla. App. 1960).
34. FLA. STAT. § 732.42 (1961).
35. 125 So.2d 332 (Fla. App. 1960).
36. 120 So.2d 15 (Fla. App. 1960).
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he sees fit so long as the disposition is not contrary to law or public policy.
The necessary corollary permits a testator to attach any condition upon a
testamentary gift so long as the condition is consistent with law and public
policy.
Thus in Cameron v. Mittuch 7 the court held that the sole beneficiary
under the decedent's will could not be substituted as a party defendant in
an action for trespass pending at the time of the decedent's death in the
absence of a provision subjecting the beneficiary's interest to satisfaction
of tort claims.
K. Will Contest
A beneficiary under a will who seeks to contest the will must first
divest himself of any beneficial interest in the estate.38 To hold otherwise
would, in effect, permit a person "to bite the hand that feeds him." This
divestment is considered a condition precedent to maintaining a cause of
action. In the case of In re Pellicer's Estate39 the court stated that the di-
vestment must be set out in the petition contesting the will. The court
did not consider that the renunciation of the will was accomplished as a
matter of course by the institution of the action itself.
L. Contract to Make a Will
Since 1957, all agreements to make a will must be in writing and signed
in the presence of two subscribing witnesses to be binding and enforce-
able.40  However, oral contracts to make a will entered into prior to 1957
are enforceable if all elements of the contract are established by clear
and convincing proof. Evidence that the decedent was indebted to another
for many favors was held not to be sufficient to support an oral promise
to make a testamentary gift. However, mutual promises are sufficient
consideration for the execution of joint and mutual wills and a court of equity
will enforce a covenant not to change the will by a later codicil. 41
M. Undue Influence
Affection or a desire to help is not a sufficient basis for the revoca-
tion of a will on the ground of undue influence. The court, in Siddens v.
Brown,42 restated the definition of undue influence established in an
earlier case:
Undue influence contemplates overt persuasion, coercion, or force
37. 113 So.2d 389 (Fla. App. 1959).
38. In re Pellicer's Estate, 118 So.2d 59 (Fla. App. 1960).
39. 118 So.2d 59 (Fla. App. 1960).
40. FLA. STAT. § 731.051(1) (1961).
41. Ugent v. Boehmke, 123 So.2d 387 (Fla. App. 1960). See also In re Shepherd's
Estate, 130 So.2d 888 (Fla. App. 1961), 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 331 (1961).
42. 119 So.2d 703 (Fla. App. 1960).
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that destroys or hampers the free agency and will power of a testator.
Mere affection or attachment or a desire to gratify the wishes of
one highly esteemed, respected or trusted may not of itself amount
to undue influence affecting the testamentary capacity of a testator.4
N. Lost Instruments
The fact that the original of a codicil is not found was held not to be
conclusive of the fact that the testatrix had revoked it. In In re Yost's
Estate4 4 the testatrix, a Florida resident, had left the codicil with her
attorney in Pennsylvania. The attorney produced the will, but did not dis-
close the fact that a codicil had been executed until a year after the will
had been filed for probate. He then produced a copy of the codicil which
he claimed to have "found" in his safe. The court held that the evidence
was not sufficient to create a presumption that the testatrix had revoked
the codicil to her will. When this presumption is sought to be established,
evidence must first establish that the testatrix had retained possession of
the codicil.
0. Competency of Parties
The testimony of an attorney regarding the competency of a husband
who waived his interest in the will of his wife was held not required when
substantial evidence was available from other sources. 45 In this way, the
court avoided the necessity of considering the matter of privilege.
P. Will Construction
The intent of the testator remains the "polestar" of the courts in will
construction cases. Thus in Lawyer v. Munro,46 in which the testatrix had
by will "requested" the executor to give her children the option to purchase
her property at a competitive price, the court refused to inquire into the
motive of the beneficiary in exercising the option conferred.
Q. Inter Vivos Gift
In Sullivan v. Chase Fed. Say. 6 Loan Ass'n 47 a joint bank account
with right of survivorship was held to be subject to attack upon the ground
that a testamentary gift was intended without complying with the require-
ments of the statute of wills. The court reasoned that since the creator of
the account did not intend an interest to pass until after his death, the
disposition was testamentary in character and the account became an asset
of the decedent's estate upon his death.
43. Id. at 704.
44. 117 So.2d 753 (Fla. App. 1960).
45. In re Lohbiller's Estate, 113 So.2d 248 (Fla. App. 1959).
46. 118 So.2d 654 (Fla. App. 1960).
47. 119 So.2d 78 (Fla. App. 1960).
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R. Adopted Children
When the remainder interest of an adopted child is contingent and
not vested, the supreme court will refuse to consider the rights of inheri-
tance of the adopted child. The court held in Geistman v. Zimmerman
Trusts4" that, while by statute49 adopted children are given legal status,
there can be no adjudication of their rights until they have become vested.
The court stated that it would not give an opinion on a hypothetical
question or on a situation that might never materialize.
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
A. Resulting Trust
In a situation in which the husband conveyed all of his property to
his mother before marriage and then paid for the property with the joint
earnings of himself and his wife, the court held that a resulting trust could
be imposed on the property in favor of the wife to the extent of her con-
tribution .50
While parol evidence may be used to establish a resulting trust, the
claim must be asserted before the passage of time has sealed the lips of
those with knowledge of the transaction. 51 Although the Statute of Frauds52
has no application in establishing a resulting trust, diligence must be used
in asserting the claim. The evidence needed to support a claim of a resul-
ting trust must be clear, positive and unequivocal. 53
B. Duties of a Trustee
One of the most important duties imposed upon a trustee is the duty
to exercise good faith and due diligence in the administration of the trust
estate. If the trustee while exercising good faith incurs an obligation, he
is entitled to reimbursement from the trust estate. This result is particularly
true when the obligation incurred confers benefit upon the trust. Thus
when the trustee hired an auditor, through whose service the trust received
benefit, the cost of the audit was appropriately charged against the trust
estate.
54
C. Constructive Trust
A constructive trust is a remedial device designed to prevent fraud
or unjust enrichment. Since it is a creature of a court of equity and arises
48. 126 So.2d 576 (Fla. App. 1961).
49. FLA. STAT. § 72.22 (1961).
50. King v. King, 113 So.2d 242 (Fla. App. 1959).
51. Martin v. Wilson, 115 So.2d 573 (Fla. App. 1959).
52. FLA. STAT. § 725.01 (1961).
53. Estey v. Vizor, 113 So.2d 576 (Fla. App. 1959).
54. Johnson v. Taylor, 116 So.2d 480 (Fla. App. 1959).
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by operation of law, the statute of limitations is not applicable to bar its
creation in an action brought against a defalcating testator.55 The con-
structive trust is by no means limited to the rectification of wrongs com-
mitted by trustees or other fiduciaries. It will also be created against a
third party who takes property belonging to a trust or estate from a fiduciary
with knowledge of all material facts.
55. Supra note 33.
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